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2K: Covid19
Pandemics are social and political as much as they are bio-
logical. COVID-19 is not just an infectious disease caused 
by the recently discovered coronavirus (SARS-Cov-2); the 
pandemic has affected all aspects of social life in most coun-
tries of the world. Because of its sudden arrival and severe 
infectiousness, COVID-19 has been likened to a disaster. But 
there are many reasons beyond its temporal urgency that 
have turned the pandemic into a disaster, at least in some 
countries. Disasters are not just unique, unexpected events: 
they have a longer temporality, involving the period predat-
ing the event and the subsequent recovery. Hurricane Katrina, 
which hit New Orleans in 2005, is a case in point. What 
turned the storm into a disaster were the underlying social 
and racial inequalities, the decaying public infrastructure, 
and the inadequate response which prioritized profit-making 
over the welfare of citizens (Adams, 2013). Katrina exempli-
fies what Klein (2007) calls “disaster capitalism”: the 
extreme profiteering from catastrophic events. The notion of 
“second-order disasters” is apt as it captures how recovery 
can cause more adverse effects than the original calamity 
(Adams, 2013). What has turned COVID-19 into a disaster is 
its spread in countries with depleted resources, inadequate 
public health policies, and underlying inequalities. It is still 
early days, but the vastly different outcomes among coun-
tries (in terms of deaths, but also secondary effects) suggest 
that social, political, economic, environmental, and cultural 
factors determine the course of the pandemic, not just the 
presence of the pathogen itself. In the essay, I will focus my 
discussion largely on the United Kingdom, which is one of 
the most severely affected countries globally.1
Digital technology has been at the center of the COVID-
19 pandemic both globally and in the United Kingdom in 
particular. Not only have the lives of millions of people 
migrated online at a stroke as part of enforced lockdowns, 
digital innovation has also been integral to the public health 
response reflecting a well-established pattern which assumes 
that digital technologies and big data mitigate the harms 
caused by disasters. The empirical evidence, however, sug-
gests the consequences of technology in disaster recovery are 
more complex at best and even harmful in some contexts. 
My earlier research of the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan in 
the Philippines found that social and mobile media amplified 
already existing social inequalities leading to second-order 
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Abstract
One of the most striking features of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United Kingdom has been the disproportionate way in 
which it has affected Black, Asian, ethnic minority, and working class people. In this article, I argue that digital technologies 
and data practices in the response to COVID-19 amplify social inequalities, which are already accentuated by the pandemic, 
thus leading to a “second-order disaster”—a human-made disaster which further traps disadvantaged people into precarity. 
Inequalities are reproduced both in the everyday uses of technology for distance learning and remote work as well as in the 
public health response. Applications such as contact tracing apps raise concerns about “function creep”—the reuse of data 
for different purposes than the one for which they were originally collected—while they normalize surveillance which has 
been traditionally used on marginalized communities. The outsourcing of the digital public health response consolidates the 
arrival of the privatized digital welfare state, which increases risks of potential discrimination.
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disasters (Madianou, 2015).2 Popular assumptions that big 
data will provide “a single source of truth” that can guide 
government decisions (Gould et al., 2020) are cast into doubt 
when taking into account the epistemological and ontologi-
cal limitations of crisis data (Crawford & Finn, 2015) such as 
the inherent biases and incompleteness of large data sets 
about disasters. What we observe during emergencies is a 
tendency to experiment with digital innovation without the 
usual public scrutiny (Madianou, 2019; Roberts, 2019) lead-
ing to concerns regarding privacy safeguards as happened 
during the Ebola epidemic (McDonald, 2016). The uses of 
machine learning and automation have increased the risks of 
discrimination in humanitarian emergencies (Madianou, 
2019). I here argue that digital practices in the United 
Kingdom’s response to COVID-19 amplify social inequali-
ties and can ultimately lead to second-order disasters.
The public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic 
led to the unprecedented situation of millions of people rely-
ing almost exclusively on communication technology to 
work, study, and socialize. It is probably fair to observe that 
there has never been such a heightened dependency on tech-
nology for such a wide range of activities at such a global 
scale. In the context of enforced physical distancing, digital 
media were a lifeline allowing elderly grandparents to inter-
act with their grandchildren, friends to celebrate birthdays, 
family members to say goodbye to a relative quarantined in 
hospital. There are untold stories of care, love, and loss—as 
there are many stories when technology is a burden and 
source of stress, for example, when it erodes the boundaries 
between work and family life. What is clear is that any 
opportunities afforded by communication technologies are 
asymmetrically distributed. This is true for all spheres of 
social life, but is particularly relevant for education and 
work. In the United Kingdom, over a third (34%) of parents 
with children aged 5 to 16 reported that their child does not 
have access to their own computer or tablet at home 
(Montacute, 2020) which is vital to participate in distance 
learning. According to two recent studies, one fifth of UK 
pupils—over two million children—did no schoolwork at 
home, or less than an hour per day (Green, 2020), with chil-
dren from better-off families spending 30% more time on 
home learning than are those from poorer families (Andrew 
et al., 2020). While virtually all (97%) privately schooled 
children had access to a computer at home, one in five of 
those on free school meals—a common indicator used to 
measure disadvantage in the United Kingdom—had no 
access. Children from the poorest families have been most 
affected by school closures, thus amplifying existing social 
inequalities.
Remote working also reveals stark asymmetries between 
those who can work from home and those whose jobs cannot 
be done remotely. It is no surprise that in the United 
Kingdom the highest rate of mortality is among working-
class men and people from black and ethnic minority back-
grounds who are most likely to be exposed to the virus due 
to the nature of their occupations, their dependency on pub-
lic transport, and higher likelihood of underlying health con-
ditions (Office for National Statistics, 2020) reflecting 
widespread health inequalities (Marmot, 2015). Data from 
the United States paint a similar picture (Taylor, 2020). By 
facilitating remote working only for a section of population, 
thus shielding them from the virus and allowing them to 
maintain their professional lives and income, digital tech-
nologies become part of a larger assemblage that perpetu-
ates and increases social inequalities. This is one of the ways 
in which digital technologies become implicated with the 
stratified effects of the coronavirus.
Digital innovation and big data are also part of the public 
health response to the coronavirus pandemic. From contact 
tracing and symptom tracking apps to digital immunity cer-
tificates and quarantine enforcement surveillance systems, 
digital technologies are being deployed in the management 
of COVID-19. In dozens of countries, contact tracing apps—
essentially tracking software installed on mobile devices that 
can determine contact between the user and any infected 
patients—have been rolled out as part of lockdown exit strat-
egies.3 In the United Kingdom, digital contact tracing is 
developed by the innovation agency of the National Health 
Service (NHSX) and is expected to be rolled out in June 
2020 as part of the government’s crisis exit strategy. The aim 
is for digital contact tracing to isolate clusters and avoid any 
virus flare-ups that will lead to blanket lockdowns. NHSX is 
also exploring digital immunity passports with private part-
ners. According to some proposals, these would be a form of 
biometrically verified digital identity that confirms whether 
the user has COVID-19 antibodies.4 Significant concerns 
have been raised regarding privacy safeguarding, surveil-
lance practices, and “function creep”: the reuse of data for 
different purposes than the ones for which they were origi-
nally collected. Furthermore, once surveillance infrastruc-
tures are established, it is difficult to dismantle them. The 
normalization of securitization post 9/11 is a case in point.
At the same time, serious reservations have been expressed 
about the effectiveness of these interventions. For example, 
the World Health Organization has cast serious doubt about 
immunity passports, mainly due to the lack of any conclusive 
scientific evidence regarding antibody-mediated immunity 
to SARS-CoV-2.5 Contact tracing apps, which have received 
the most widespread coverage in the United Kingdom and 
United States, are not deemed effective unless 56% of the 
population uses them (Hinch et al., 2020). Singapore, the 
first country to launch a contact tracing app in March 2020, 
saw a spike of cases after the app was rolled out. Only a fifth 
of the city-state’s population had downloaded the app6 while 
COVID-19 spread undetected in the cramped dormitories 
where migrant workers live—confirming that technological 
solutions cannot fix social inequalities.7 The list of the poten-
tial limitations of digital contact tracing is too long to detail 
here.8 What matters is that the concern over privacy and sur-
veillance is valid whether contact tracing apps succeed in 
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suppressing virus outbreaks or not. Even if digital contact 
tracing fails, the dissemination of such apps can still expand 
the power of the state and private companies as well as con-
tribute to the entrenchment of surveillance. Reports have 
already highlighted how various contact tracing apps share 
data with private companies and governments. For example, 
the Alerta Guarte app in Guatemala shares sensitive user 
data with its US-based app developer as well as the national 
government which has explicitly stated that citizens should 
keep the app installed for further purposes such as security.9 
The appropriation of the term “contact tracing” by the 
Minnesota Public Safety Commissioner to refer to the iden-
tification of potential suspects during the Black Lives Matter 
protests in the wake of George Floyd’s killing in May 2020 
confirmed fears that “contact tracing” normalizes surveil-
lance in spheres extending beyond the public health emer-
gency.10 Inequality goes hand in hand with discrimination 
and surveillance as the latter has been systematically used 
on marginalized and minority people (Benjamin, 2019; 
Browne, 2015).
The digital response to the pandemic has been largely 
analyzed as a dramatic extension of state power.11 While 
states are responsible for public health policies, a closer look 
reveals the extensive involvement of the private sector. 
Digital innovation is almost always the result of public–pri-
vate partnerships. In the United Kingdom, NHSX has part-
nerships with Amazon, Google, Microsoft, and Palantir 
Technologies.12 In addition to the state response, private 
firms such as PwC are rolling out their bespoke contact trac-
ing app which they plan to make mandatory for employees 
returning to work.13 Such developments open the door for the 
monitoring of employees including after COVID-19. While 
much of the public debate on digital contact tracing has 
focused on privacy and surveillance concerns, one the most 
compelling consequences of this innovation is the way it 
entrenches the “digital welfare state,” a term that is used to 
refer how the systems of “social protection and assistance are 
increasingly driven by digital data and technologies that are 
used to automate, predict, identify, surveil, detect, target and 
punish” (Alston, 2019). While this definition captures the 
digitization of welfare, it does not highlight the fact the digi-
tal welfare state is also increasingly privatized. Large tech-
nology companies are responsible for providing the hardware 
or computational systems that underpin automation, identifi-
cation, and surveillance.
We discern a number of different logics by dissecting 
public–private partnerships: big technology companies are 
driven by a logic of profit and desire for growth. Conversely, 
the state is driven by the imperative to manage the disease as 
well as a logic of control. Also present is the logic of soluti-
onism: the desire to find technological solutions to complex 
social problems. Solutionism is very attractive especially in 
the absence of a clear exit from the pandemic, such as a vac-
cine or an effective drug treatment. Given the impending 
economic downturn predicted to ensue from the crisis, 
technological solutions provide governments with a tangible 
thing that they seem to be doing. At the same time, the logic 
of profit undermines public institutions. By providing ser-
vices or licensing products to run public services, technol-
ogy companies hollow out the infrastructures of the welfare 
state, ultimately leaving them weakened. This structural 
transformation, the consolidation of the digital and priva-
tized welfare state, is one of the most critical dimensions of 
the digital response to the COVID-19 crisis.
Technology companies have used the pandemic as an 
opportunity to extend their reach well beyond the public 
health response. The massive experiment of millions of 
people migrating online by default has been seized by com-
panies which see opportunities not only for profit, but also 
for entrenching themselves in public life. The most compel-
ling evidence of this new wave of “disaster capitalism” 
came when the Governor of New York State, Andrew 
Cuomo, appointed Eric Schmidt, the former CEO of 
Google, to head a panel that will radically rethink the New 
York City after COVID-19. This “screen new deal,” accord-
ing to Naomi Klein (2020), involves the promotion of 
online education, telemedicine, and smart city infrastruc-
ture among other things which will increase opportunities 
for data extraction and profit (Zuboff, 2019). At the same 
time, this signals a further privatization of public space and 
public institutions (schools, universities, hospitals). The 
irony is that just weeks before the pandemic took hold, 
technology companies were heavily criticized for a litany 
of failings including their lack of accountability. The “shock 
doctrine” (Klein, 2007) that follows all disasters stifled 
criticisms and quickly embraced technology as a “solution” 
to life in lockdown and beyond.
I argued some years ago that digital technology contrib-
utes to “second-order disasters”—the human-made disasters 
that trap already disadvantaged people into precarity 
(Madianou, 2015). So far, the digital response to COVID-19 
appears to be no exception. The evidence from the United 
Kingdom and around the world shows that the patterns from 
previous disasters are being repeated. The uses of technol-
ogy amplify existing inequalities, which are already accen-
tuated by the pandemic. This is apparent in the spheres of 
education and work where digital technology is deeply 
implicated with the stratified effects of lockdown policies. 
The use of technologies in the public health response further 
reproduces inequalities. Experimentation with technology 
carries privacy risks and raises concerns about data sharing 
with states and private companies. Applications such as con-
tact tracing apps normalize surveillance which has been tra-
ditionally used on marginalized communities. The 
outsourcing of the digital public health response consoli-
dates the arrival of the digital welfare state, which is increas-
ingly privatized. The combined digitization and privatization 
of welfare signals a hollowing out of public institutions—
not just welfare but also schools, universities, cities which 
will in turn further accentuate inequalities and potential 
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discrimination through automation and algorithmic filtering 
(Benjamin, 2019). The article has focused mainly in the 
United Kingdom, but some of the examples examined sug-
gest that the argument may be applicable to other contexts.
There is a further secondary effect: placing so much 
emphasis on technological solutions risks depoliticizing the 
COVID-19 emergency. The logic of technological solution-
ism has the capacity to occlude the workings of technology 
and digital capitalism with extraordinary ease (Madianou, 
2019). This matters because now, more than ever, there is an 
imperative to collectively reimagine the future after the pan-
demic. And this is a deeply political task.
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Notes
 1. At the time of writing, the United Kingdom had the highest 
death toll on Europe and the second highest in the world after 
the United States. For a list of all COVID-19 cases globally, 
see https://gisanddata.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/
index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6
 2. That research found that during the delayed recovery the vast 
majority of low-income participants were pushed further into 
poverty. For example, one year after the Typhoon made land-
fall, the majority of research participants were unemployed 
and continued to live in temporary accommodation. Their 
social media uses, while creative, did not offer any signifi-
cant opportunities for a redistribution of resources. Only a 
very small number of middle-class professionals were able 
to exploit opportunities in social media to improve their eco-
nomic and social standing (Madianou, 2015).
 3. For a list of all digital contact tracing projects to date, see 
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/07/1000961/
launching-mittr-covid-tracing-tracker/
 4. https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/07/1000961/
launching-mittr-covid-tracing-tracker/
 5. https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/
immunity-passports-in-the-context-of-covid-19
 6. https://qz.com/1842200/singapore-wants-everyone-to-down-
load-covid-19-contact-tracing-apps/
 7. A new contact tracing app was made mandatory for migrant 
workers in Singapore at the end of May 2020, raising additional 
concerns regarding consent, the right to “opt out” and poten-
tial stigmatization (as the app is only mandatory for migrants) 
https://privacyinternational.org/examples/3890/singapore-con-
tact-tracing-app-made-mandatory-migrant-workers
 8. For a review see the report by the Ada Lovelace Institute (2020).
 9. https://privacyinternational.org/examples/3660/guatemalan-
health-information-app-collects-personal-data. See the work 
of Privacy International more broadly for reports on the digital 
response to covid-19.
10. https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/6/1/21277393/minnesota 
-protesters-contact-tracing-covid-19
11. See The Economist, “Everything is under control: the state in 
covid-19”: https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/03/26/
the-state-in-the-time-of-covid-19
12. https://healthtech.blog.gov.uk/2020/03/28/the-power-of-data 
-in-a-pandemic/
13. https://www.ft.com/content/caeb250b-8d8b-4eaa-969c 
-62a8b58464aa
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